Preventing Your Faults From Telling Your Secrets: Defenses Against
  Pigeonhole Attacks by Shinde, Shweta et al.
Preventing Your Faults from Telling Your Secrets:
Defenses against Pigeonhole Attacks
Shweta Shinde, Zheng Leong Chua, Viswesh Narayanan, Prateek Saxena
National University of Singapore
{shweta24, chuazl, visweshn, prateeks} @ comp.nus.edu.sg
ABSTRACT
New hardware primitives such as Intel SGX secure a user-
level process in presence of an untrusted or compromised OS.
Such “enclaved execution” systems are vulnerable to several
side-channels, one of which is the page fault channel. In
this paper, we show that the page fault side-channel has
sufficient channel capacity to extract bits of encryption keys
from commodity implementations of cryptographic routines
in OpenSSL and Libgcrypt— leaking 27% on average and
up to 100% of the secret bits in many case-studies. To mit-
igate this, we propose a software-only defense that masks
page fault patterns by determinising the program’s mem-
ory access behavior. We show that such a technique can
be built into a compiler, and implement it for a subset of
C which is sufficient to handle the cryptographic routines
we study. This defense when implemented generically can
have significant overhead of up to 4000×, but with help of
developer-assisted compiler optimizations, the overhead re-
duces to at most 29.22% in our case studies. Finally, we
discuss scope for hardware-assisted defenses, and show one
solution that can reduce overheads to 6.77% with support
from hardware changes.
1. INTRODUCTION
Operating systems are designed to execute at higher priv-
ileges than applications on commodity systems. Recently,
this model of assuming a trusted OS has come under ques-
tion, with the rise of vulnerabilities targeting privileged soft-
ware [23]. Consequently, new hardware primitives have emerged
to safeguard applications from untrusted OSes [38, 39, 48].
One such primitive is Intel SGX’s enclaved execution which
supports secure execution of sensitive applications on an un-
trusted OS. The SGX hardware guarantees that all the ap-
plication memory is secured and the OS cannot access the
application content. During execution, applications rely on
the OS for memory management, scheduling and other sys-
tem services. Intel SGX holds the promise of affording a
private virtual address space for a trusted process that is
immune to active probing attacks from the hostile OS. How-
ever, side-channels such as the page-fault channel have been
recently discovered [52]. Since the OS manages the virtual-
to-physical page translation tables for the sensitive appli-
cation, it can observe all page faults and the faulting page
addresses, which leaks information. These attacks show that
mere memory access control and encryption is not enough to
defend against the OS, which motivates a systematic study
of defense solutions to mitigate this channel.
In this paper, we first show that the channel capacity of
the page-fault channel is sufficient to extract secret key in-
formation in existing implementations of cryptographic rou-
tines (OpenSSL and Libgcrypt). Cryptographic routines are
vital to reducing the TCB and enclaved applications are ex-
pected to critically rely on them to establish secure channel
with the I/O, filesystem and network sub-systems [10,26,43].
To perform an attack, the adversarial OS allocates a mini-
mum number of physical pages to the sensitive enclave pro-
cess, such that memory accesses spill out of the allocated
set as much as possible, incurring page faults. We call such
attacks as pigeonhole attacks1 because they force the vic-
tim process to spill outside the allocated physical pages,
thereby maximizing the channel capacity of the observed
side-channel. They affect a long line of systems such as Intel
SGX [39], InkTag [27], PodArch [45], and OverShadow [17]
which protect application memory.
The page fault channel is much easier for the OS to ex-
ploit as compared to other side-channels. For example, in
case of cache side-channel, the hardware resources such as
size, number of data entries, eviction algorithm and so on are
often fixed. The adversary has a limited control on these fac-
tors and the observations are mainly local to small fragments
of program logic. On the contrary, in case of pigeonhole at-
tacks, adversary is much stronger, adaptive, and controls
the underlying physical resource (the number of physical
pages). Moreover, it can make far more granular clock mea-
surements (both global and local) by invoking and inducing
a fault in the enclave. To defend applications against this
unaddressed threat, we seek a security property that allows
an application to execute on any input data while being ag-
nostic to changes in the number of pages allocated. The
property assures that the OS cannot glean any sensitive in-
formation by observing page faults. We call this property
as page-fault obliviousness (or PF-obliviousness).
In this work, we propose a purely software-based defense
against pigeonhole attacks to achieve PF-obliviousness. We
point out that defenses against time and cache side-channels
do not directly prevent pigeonhole attacks, and achieving
PF-obliviousness has been an open problem [52]. Our goal
is to guarantee that even if the OS observes the page faults, it
cannot distinguish the enclaved execution under any values
for the secret input variables. Our propose approach is called
deterministic multiplexing, wherein the enclave application
exhibits the same page fault pattern under all values possi-
ble for the secret input variables. Specifically, we modify the
program to pro-actively access all its input-dependent data
and code pages in the same sequence irrespective of the in-
put. In our empirical case studies, the naive implementation
of deterministic multiplexing results in an overhead of about
705× on an average and maximum 4000×! Therefore, we
1 These attacks were also referred to as controlled-channel
attacks in previous work.
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propose several optimizations techniques which exploit spe-
cific program structure and makes the overhead statistically
insignificant in 8 cases, while the worst-case performance is
29.22%. All our defenses are implemented as an extension to
the LLVM compiler, presently handling a subset of C/C++
sufficient to handle the cryptographic case studies. Finally,
we discuss alternative solutions for efficient defenses, and
suggest a new defense which requires hardware support, but
yields an acceptable worst-case overhead of 6.67% for our
case studies.
Contributions. We make the following contributions:
• Pigeonhole attacks on real cryptographic routines. We
demonstrate that the page-fault channel has sufficient
capacity to extract significant secret information in
widely-used basic cryptographic implementations (AES,
EdDSA, RSA and so on).
• Defense. We propose PF-obliviousness and design de-
terministic multiplexing approach that eliminates in-
formation leakage via page fault channel.
• Optimizations & System Evaluation. We apply our
defense to the vulnerable cryptographic utilities from
Libgcrypt and OpenSSL, and devise sound optimiza-
tions. In our experiments, deterministic multiplexing
amounts to an average of 705× overhead without opti-
mization, and is reduced to an acceptable average and
worst case overhead of 29.22% after optimization.
2. PIGEONHOLE ATTACKS
In a non-enclaved environment, the OS is responsible for
managing the process memory. Specifically, when launching
the process, the OS creates the page tables and populates
empty entries for virtual addresses specified in the applica-
tion binary. When a process begins its execution, none of
its virtual pages are mapped to the physical memory. When
the process tries to access a virtual address, the CPU in-
curs a page fault. The CPU reports information such as
the faulting address, type of page access, and so on to the
OS on behalf of the faulting process, and the OS swaps in
the content from the disk. Similarly, the OS deletes the
virtual-to-physical mappings when it reclaims the process
physical memory as and when requested or when necessary.
Thus, a benign OS makes sure that the process has sufficient
memory for execution, typically, at least 20 pages in Linux
systems [13].
2.1 Benign Enclaved Execution
The aim of enclave-like systems is to safeguard all the
sensitive process (called as an enclave) memory during the
execution. These systems use memory encryption and /
or memory access controls to preserve the confidentiality of
the sensitive content. The process memory is protected such
that the hardware allows access in ring-3 only when a legiti-
mate owner process requests to access its content [17]. When
the OS in ring-0 or any other process in ring-3 tries to access
the memory, the hardware either encrypts the content on-
demand or denies the access. This guarantees that neither
the OS nor other malicious processes can access the physical
memory of an enclave. In enclaved execution, the OS mem-
ory management functions are unchanged. The onus still lies
with the OS to decide which process gets how much phys-
ical memory, and which pages should be loaded at which
addresses to maintain the process-OS semantics. The OS
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Figure 1: Problem Setting. Process executing in an
enclave on untrusted OS.
controls the page table entries and is also notified on a page
fault. This CPU design allows the OS to transparently do
its management while the hardware preserves the confiden-
tiality and integrity of the process memory content. For
example, if there are not many concurrent processes exe-
cuting, the OS may scale up the memory allocation to a
process. Later, the OS may decrease the process memory
when it becomes loaded with memory requests from other
processes. Further, the CPU reports all the interrupts (such
as page fault, general protection fault) directly to the OS.
Figure 1 shows the scenario in enclaved execution, wherein
the untrusted OS can use 2 interfaces: allocate and de-
allocate to directly change the page table for allocating or
deallocating process pages respectively. Many systems guar-
antee secure execution of processes in presence of untrusted
OSes, either at the hardware or software level. Execution
of processes in such isolated environments is referred to as
cloaked execution [17], enclaved execution [39], shielded ex-
ecution [10], and so on depending on the underlying system.
For simplicity, we refer to all of them as enclaved execution
in this paper, since the underlying mechanism is the same
as described above. See [7, 8] for SGX-specific details.
2.2 Pigeonhole Attack via Page Faults
In enclaved execution, the OS sees all the virtual addresses
where the process faults 2. This forms the primary basis of
the page fault side-channel. Each page fault in the enclaved
execution leaks the information that the process is accessing
a specific page at a specific point in execution time. Since
the OS knows the internal structure of the program such as
the layout of the binary, mmap-ed pages, stack, heap, library
addresses and so on, the OS can profile the execution of
the program and observe the page fault pattern. In fact it
can invoke and execute the enclave application for a large
number of inputs in offline mode to record the corresponding
page fault patterns. At runtime, the OS can observe the
page fault pattern for the user input and map it to its pre-
computed database, thus learning the sensitive input. The
remaining question is, what degree of control does the OS
have on the channel capacity?
An adversarial OS that is actively misusing this side-channel
always aims to maximize the page faults and extract infor-
mation for a given input. On the upside, applications often
follow temporal and spatial locality of reference and thus
do not incur many page faults during execution. Thus, the
2In our model, the trusted CPU or hypervisor only reports
the base address of the faulting page while masking the offset
within the page (unlike in InkTag [27]).
0x7F..E8CC: mov Table1[idx], rax
idx < 1c idx >= 1c
P1: 0x7F..5000 P2: 0x7F..6000
Table 0 Table 1
Figure 2: Attack via input dependent data page ac-
cess in AES. The data lookup in either in P1 or P2,
which is decided by secret byte.
information leaked via the benign page faults from the en-
clave is not significant. However, note that the adversarial
OS controls the process page tables and decides which vir-
tual pages are to be loaded in the physical memory at a given
point. To perpetrate the pigeonhole attack, the OS allocates
only three pages at most to the program at a particular mo-
ment — the code page, the source address and the destina-
tion address 3. Lets call this as a pigeonhole set. Thus, any
subsequent instructions that access any other page (either
code or data) will fall out of the pigeonhole set resulting in a
page fault 4. The faulting address of this instruction reveals
what the process is trying to access. In most applications, a
large fraction of memory accesses patterns are defined by the
input. To extract the information about this input, the OS
can pre-empt the process by inducing a page fault on nearly
every instruction. Our analysis shows that empirically, ev-
ery 10th code / data access crosses page boundaries on an
average in standard Linux binaries 5. This implies that the
OS can single step the enclaved execution at the granularity
of 10 instructions to make observations about the virtual ad-
dress access patterns. Thus, by resorting to this extremity
the OS achieves the maximum leakage possible via the page
fault channel.
2.3 Attack Examples
A pigeonhole attack can manifest in any generic appli-
cation running in an enclaved environment. In this work,
we limit our examples to cryptographic implementations for
two reasons. First, even a minimalistic enclave will at least
execute these routines for network handshake, session es-
tablishment and so on. For example, SGX applications such
as OTP generators, secure ERM, secure video conferenc-
ing, etc. use an enclave for the TLS connections and other
cryptographic functions on sensitive data [26]. Second, the
previous work does not study the leakage via page faults
in cryptographic routines since they are assumed to be al-
ready hardened against other side-channel attacks such as
timing and power consumption. On the contrary, we show
that cache hardening and memory encryption is not enough.
This is because caches are accessed by lower address bits
while pages are accessed by higher order bits. Only masking
lower order bits does not necessarily mask the page access
order. Let us take a look at two representative examples to
demonstrate real pigeonhole attacks.
Input Dependent Data Page Access. We choose a real
3An x86 instruction accesses at most 3 address locations.
4Note that the process does not suffer denial of service, only
its progress is slowed down due to excessive page faults.
5We tested CoreUtils utilities under random inputs.
ec_mul{…} P1:
0xA7310
ec_mul(r, G):
add_points{…} P2:
0xA6CB0
test_bit{…} P3:
0x9EB30
res = O
nbits = |r|
for (i = nbits-1; i>=0; i--):
res = dup_point(res)
if (test_bit(r[i])):
res = add_points(res, G)
return res
r[i]==1
r[i]==0
Figure 3: Attack via input dependent control page
access in EdDSA implementation. The control to
either P1 or P2 is dependent on secret bit.
example of AES from the Libgcrypt v1.6.3 compiled with
gcc v4.8.2 on Linux system. In this example, the adversary
can learn 25 bits of the input secret key. Note that the best
known purely cryptanalytic attack for AES leak about 2-3
bits of information about the key [12]. Any leakage beyond
that is a serious amount of leakage. A typical AES encryp-
tion routine involves multiple S-Box lookups. This step is
used to map an input index to a non-linear value, followed
by the MixColumn step [22]. In the Libgcrypt implemen-
tation of AES, the lookup tables are designed to contain
both S-box values as well as pre-computed values for Mix-
Columns transform for optimization [2]. There are four such
tables (Table0 to Table3) which are used in table look-ups
at various rounds of encryption process. All the lookup op-
erations in the first round take in a byte of the secret input
key, XOR it with the plain text (which can be set to 0s) and
emit a corresponding value in the table. Each of these tables
comprise of 256 entries and are statically loaded based on
the compiler-generated layout. In our example, Table1 and
Table3 cross page boundaries. Specifically, indexes below
0x1C are in first page (P1) while the indexes from 0x1C to
0xFF are in second page (P2). Figure 2 shows the snapshot
of the virtual address space of AES, where Table1 is loaded.
During an enclaved execution, the process will exhibit page
access profile depending on the input secret key and the
plain text. The adversary adaptively selects the plain text
and observes the page faults to learn the secret key. For
example, lets say the key is 0x1A3E0946 and the adversary
choses the plain text to be 0x00000000. Then the result-
ing XOR is 0x1A3E0946, and the page access profile will be
[P1P2P1P2]. An adversarial OS observing these page faults
knows if the enclave is accessing page P1 or P2. Thus, for
each access, this information reduces the OSes uncertainty
from 256 choices to either 28 or 228 choices. In case of AES,
these two portions of the table are accessed 4 times each in
every round for a 128 / 196 / 256-bit key. The OS can adap-
tively execute the process for different known plain texts and
observe the access page access profile across multiple runs.
This amounts to a leakage of 25 bits in just the first of the
total 10 / 12 / 14 rounds of AES. Thus, 25 bits is a lower
bound. We have experimentally confirmed this leakage (See
Appendix C for details).
Input Dependent Code Page Access. As a second ex-
ample, consider EdDSA which is an elliptic curve using with
twisted Edward curve and is used in GnuPG and SSL. In
EdDSA signing algorithm [11], the main ingredient is a ran-
domly chosen scalar value r which forms the session key.
The value of r is private and if leaked it can be used to
forge a signature for any arbitrary message. We show how
the adversary can use pigeonhole attacks to completely leak
the private value r. Figure 3 shows a code snippet and
the page layout for the scalar point multiplication routine
of Libgcrypt implementation compiled with gcc v4.8.2. It
takes in an integer scalar (r in this case), a point (G), and
sets the result to the resulting point. The multiplication
is implemented by repeated addition — for each bit in the
scalar, the routine checks the value and decides if it needs
to perform an addition or not. The main routine (ec_mul),
the sub-routines for duplication (dup_point) and testing the
bit (test_bit) are located in three different pages denoted
as P1, P2, P3 respectively. Interestingly, the addition sub-
routine (add_points) is located in pages P1 and P2. A
page profile satisfying a regular expression [P1 P2 P1 P3 P1
(P1P2)
∗] implies a bit value 1 and [P1 P2 P1 P3 P1] implies
a 0 bit value. Essentially, the OS can learn the exact value
of the random integer scalar r picked by the process. This
amounts to a total leakage of the secret, and in fact enables
the OS to forge signatures on behalf of the enclave.
We demonstrate more attacks on cryptographic imple-
mentations of Libgcrypt and OpenSSL in Section 6.1. These
attacks apply to cloud applications such as multi-tenant web
servers and MapReduce platforms [10,20,43,56,57].
3. OVERVIEW
The malicious OS can use pigeonhole attacks to observe
the input-dependent memory accesses and learn the input
program secrets. We now discuss our approach to prevent
this leakage.
3.1 Security Definitions & Assumptions
Lets represent an enclave program P that computes on
inputs I to produce output O as (P, I) 7→ O, such that both
I and O are secret and are encrypted in RAM. In case of
enclaved execution, the adversary can observe the sequence
of page faults. We term this knowledge of the adversary as
the page access profile. Note that each observed profile is
specific to an input to the program, and is defined as:
Definition (Page Access Profile.) For a given program P
and a single input I, the page access profile
−→
V P I is a vector
of tuples 〈V Pi〉, where V Pi is the virtual page number of the
ith page fault observed by the OS.
To model the security, we compare the execution of a pro-
gram on a real enclaved system with its execution on an
“ideal” system. The ideal system is one which has infinite
private memory and therefore the program execution doesn’t
raise faults. On the other hand, the real system has limited
memory and the enclave will incur page faults during its ex-
ecution. Specifically, we define these two models as follows:
• ∞-memory Enclave Model (M∞−model). The enclaved
execution of program on a system with an unbounded
physical memory such that the page access profile is ∅.
• Bounded-memory Enclave Model (MB−model). En-
claved Execution of program such that for any instruc-
tion in the program, the enclave has the least number
of pages required for executing that instructions 6.
Definition (Page Access Profile Distinguishability) Given
a program (P, I)→ O, we say P exhibits page access profile
6In our case it is at most three pages, which is the max-
imum number of pages required to execute any Intel x86
instruction.
distinguishability if there exists an efficient adversary A such
that ∃ I0, I1 ∈ I and b ∈ {0, 1}, for which the advantage:
Adv(A) = |Pr[Exp(−→V P Ib=0) = 1] − Pr[Exp(
−→
V P Ib=1) = 1]|
is non-negligible.
If a probabilistic polynomial time-bounded adversary can
distinguish the execution of the program for two different
inputs by purely observing the page access profile, then the
program exhibits page access profile distinguishability. A
safe program exhibits no leakage via the page fault channels;
we define page-fault obliviousness as a security property of
a program as follows:
Definition (PF-obliviousness) Given a program P w.r.t.
inputs I, the PF-obliviousness states that if there exists an
efficient adversary A which can distinguish (−→V P I0 ,
−→
V P I1)
for ∃ I0, I1 ∈ ~I in the MB−model, then there exists an ad-
versary A′ which can distinguish I0, I1 in the M∞−model.
Our definition is a relative guarantee — it states that any
information that the adversary learns by observing the exe-
cution of program on a bounded private memory, can always
be learned by observing the execution even on an unbounded
memory (for e.g., the total runtime of the program). Such
information leaked can be gleaned even without the page
fault channel. Our defense does not provide any absolute
guarantees against all possible side- channels. If there are
additional side channels in a PF-oblivious program, they can
be eliminated with orthogonal defenses.
Scope and Assumptions. Our work considers a software-
based adversary running at ring-0; all hardware is assumed
to be trusted. Further, the following challenges are beyond
the goals of this work:
• A1. Our attacks and defenses are independent of
other side-channels such as time, power consumption,
cache latencies, and minor execution time differences
between two different memory access instructions that
raise no faults. If such a difference is discernible, then
we can show that they provides a source of advan-
tage even in an execution with no page faults (∞-
model). Application developers can deploy orthogonal
defenses to prevent against these side-channels [55].
Our defenses do not prevent information leakage via
untrusted I/O, system-call, and filesystem channels [16].
• A2. Once a page has been allocated to the enclave, the
OS can take it away only on a memory fault. We do not
consider the case where the OS removes enclave pages
via a timer-based pre-emption, since the adversary’s
clock granularity is much coarser in this case and likely
yields a negligible advantage.
3.2 Problem & Approach Overview
Problem Statement. Given a program P and set of secret
inputs I, we seek a program transformation T : P 7→ P ′ such
that the transformed program P ′ satisfies PF-obliviousness
with respect to all possible values of I.
Consider a program executing on sensitive input. The
execution path of such a program can be defined by the se-
quence of true and false branches taken at the conditional
statements encountered during the execution. Each set of
straight-line instructions executed and corresponding data
accessed between the branching condition statements can be
1 foo (int x, int y)
2 {
3 z = 2 * y
4 if (z != x)
5 {
6 if (z < x + 10)
7 path_c()
8 else
9 path_b()
10 }
11 else
12 path_a()
13 }
z = 2*y
False True
TrueFalse
BB3
BB1
BB5
z != x
path_a z < x+10
path_b path_c
BB2
BB4
BB6
z = 2*y
False True
TrueFalse
BB3
BB1
BB5
z != x
path_a z < x+10
dummy_pad path_b path_c
BB2
BB4
BB6BB6'BB5'
dummy_pad
Figure 4: (a) Code snippet for example function foo where x and y are secret. (b) Unbalanced execution tree.
(c) Corresponding balanced execution tree.
viewed as an execution block. Let us assume that each exe-
cution block has the same number of memory accesses and
by assumption A1 each memory access takes approximately
same amount of time. Then, all such paths of a program
can be represented using a tree, say the execution tree such
that each node in the tree is an execution block connected
by branch edges. For example, the function foo() in Fig-
ure 4 (a) has 3 execution paths in the execution tree shown
in Figure 4 (b). Each of the paths a, b, c can be executed
by running the program on the inputs (x = 4, y = 2), (x =
8, y = 9) and (x = 6, y = 5) respectively.
Page access profile is inherently input dependent, so any-
one who observes the page access profile can extract bits of
information about the input. However, if the page access
profile remains the same irrespective of the input, then the
leakage via page fault channel will drop to zero [36,51]. We
call this transformation strategy as determinising the page
access profile. We adopt this strategy and enforce a deter-
ministic page access profile for possible paths in the program
execution. The enclaved execution always sequentially ac-
cesses all the code and data pages that can be used at a
particular memory-bound instruction for each execution. In
our example, Figure 4, we will access both BB3 as well as
BB4 irrespective of the branching condition. Similarly, we
also apply it at level 4, so that the complete program path
is BB1, BB2, BB3, BB4, BB5′, BB6′, BB5, BB6 for all in-
puts. Thus, deterministic execution makes one real access
and several fake accesses to determinise the page access pro-
file. It is easy to see that under any input the execution
exhibits the same page access profile.
The challenge that remains is: how to execute such fake
accesses while still doing the actual intended computations.
We present a simple mechanism to achieve this. First we
use the program’s execution tree to identify what are all the
code and data pages that are used at each level of the tree
for all possible inputs (BB3, BB4 at level 3 in our example).
This gives us the set of pages for replicated-access. Next,
we use a multiplexing mechanism to load-and-execute the
correct execution block. To achieve this, we break each code
block execution into a fetch step and an execute step. In the
fetch step, all the execution blocks at the same level in the
execution tree are fetched from memory sequentially. In
the execute step the multiplexer will select the real block
and execute it as-is. In our example, for (x = 4, y = 2),
the multiplexer will fetch all blocks but execute only BB3
at level 3, and for (x = 8, y = 9) or (x = 6, y = 5), the
multiplexer will execute BB4.
4. DESIGN
There can be several ways for determinising the page ac-
cess profile; selecting the best transformation is an optimiza-
tion problem. We discuss one such transformation which can
be applied generically and then present the program-specific
transformations which incur lower costs (Section 5).
4.1 Setup
It is simple to adapt the standard notion of basic blocks to
our notion of execution blocks. In our example code snippet
in Figure 4 (a), we have 6 such execution blocks BB1 to BB6.
In case of BB1, the code page C will comprise of virtual page
address of the statement z = 2 * y, and data pages D will
have virtual page address of variables z and y.
Note that the execution tree in Figure 4 (b) is unbal-
anced, i.e., the depth of the tree is not constant for all pos-
sible paths in the program. This imbalance in itself leaks
information about the input to an adversary even without
pigeonhole attacks simply by observing the function start-
to-end time. For example, the first path (path_a) in Fig-
ure 4 (b) is of depth 2 and is only taken when value of z
equals value of x. If the adversary can try all possible values
of secret, then the tree depth becomes an oracle to check
if the guess is correct. To capture the information leaked
strictly via the page fault channel, we limit our scope to
balanced execution tree. If the tree is unbalanced, then the
input space is partitioned into sets which are distinguishable
in the original program in the ∞-model. Since we limit our
scope to achieving indistinguishability relative to ∞-model,
we safely assume a balanced execution tree as shown in Fig-
ure 4 (c) [40]. Techniques such as loop unrolling, block size
balancing with memory access and NOP padding can be used
to balance the tree depth and block sizes [18]. In our expe-
rience, cryptographic routines which are hardened against
timing and cache side-channels generally exhibit balanced
execution trees. For the set of programs in our study, if
necessary, we perform a pre-preparation step manually to
balance the execution tree explicitly.
Even after the execution tree is balanced, the pigeonhol-
ing adversary knows the sequence of the execution blocks
that were executed for a given input only by observing page
faults. For example, lets assume that the execution blocks
BB5 and BB6 are in two different pages P1 and P2 respec-
tively. Then the result of the branching condition z < x+10
will either cause a page fault for P1 or P2, revealing bit of
information about the sensitive input x and y. Given a bal-
anced execution tree, we design a transformation function to
make the page access profile independent of the input [36].
4.2 Deterministic Multiplexing
Table[idx]
Data
MUX
Selector
P1
P2
Table 1
Data Staging Area
Table 1
Figure 5: Deterministic Multiplexing to prevent
leakage via data access. The multiplexer accesses
the correct offset in the staging area.
r[i]== 1 or 0
add_points{..}
Code
MUX
Selector
P1
P2 ec_mul {…}
Code Staging Area
add_points{..}
ec_mul {…}
Figure 6: Deterministic Multiplexing to prevent
leakage via code page access. The multiplexer ex-
ecutes the correct function in the staging area.
We now discuss a concrete design of our transformation
namely deterministic multiplexing and demonstrate how it
can be supported to transform legacy C / C++ applications
in the current compiler infrastructure.
Basic Multiplexing. In the fetch phase, we copy the code
blocks at the same level of the execution tree to a temporary
page — the code staging area (SAcode). All data that may
be used by each of these sensitive code blocks is copied to a
separate temporary page — the data staging area (SAdata).
Then in the execution phase, we use an access multiplexer
which selects the correct code and data blocks and executes
it (by jumping to it). At the end of the sensitive execution,
the content from data staging area is then pushed back to
the actual addresses. If the execution changes any data in
the staging area, the new values are updated. The rest of the
values are just copied back unchanged. Note that all these
operations are done in a sequence in the staging area (one
code page). Thus this execution is atomic — no page faults
can occur between them. From an adversarial viewpoint,
the execution is performed within the boundary of single
code and single data page. So all that the adversary can
see is the same sequence of page faults for any input. Thus
our multiplexed fetch and execute mechanism ensures that
the OS cannot determine which code and data block was
actually used within the staging area.
Example. For our AES case, we apply deterministic mul-
tiplexing and copy the data table T3 to staging area (See
Figure 5). Each data access now incurs 2 data page copies
and a code page copy followed by multiplexed accesses. Sim-
ilarly for EdDSA, we can multiplex the called functions into
SAcode (See Figure 6). This asserts that the OS cannot dif-
ferentiate whether the true or the false branch was executed,
by looking at the page access profile. Thus, in both the cases
the OS can observe the fetch and execute operations only at
the page granularity. It cannot determine which of the fetch
or execution operations is real and which is replicated.
Compacted Multiplexing. In the multiplexing mecha-
nism, it is important that both SAcode and SAdata must fit
in a single page each to prevent information leakage. For
ensuring this, we specifically pick a block size such that at
Labels L ::= high | low
Expressions e ::= e1  e2 | e1 ? e2 : e3 | } e
::= | lval | lval | c |
::= | foo (e1, e2, . . ., en)
c ::= const
lval ::= var | var [e]
Unary  ::= & | * | ++ | −−
} ::= ∼ | ! | + | − | sizeof
Binary  ::= + | − | * | / | %
| && | >> | <<
| | | & | ˆ | != | ==
| > | < | >= | <=
Commands P ::= lval := e
| if (e) then P else P’
| do {P} while (deec)
| while (deec) do {P}
| for (e1 ; de2ec ; e3) {P}
| foo (e1, e2, . . ., en) {P}
| return e
Program S ::= begin_pf_sensitive P
end_pf_sensitive
Figure 7: The grammar of the language supported
by our compiler. deec denotes that the loop is
bounded by a constant c.
any given level in the execution tree, all the blocks and the
corresponding data always fit in a single page. However,
there are cases where the execution tree is deep and has
large number of blocks (total size of more than 4096 bytes)
at a certain level. This results in a multi-page staging area.
To address this, we use a compaction scheme to fit the stag-
ing area in a single page. Specifically, in the fetch phase we
create a dummy (not real) block address in the staging area.
The blocks which are not going to be executed are saved at
this dummy location during the fetch step. Each new block
from the execution tree overwrites (overlap) the same loca-
tion. Only the real block (which will be executed) is copied
in a non-overlapping address in the page. We term this as
a smart copy because each copy operation writes to either
dummy or real page-offset in the staging area. The adver-
sary OS does not see the offset of the faulting address, and
hence cannot distinguish a dummy vs. a real copy. Thus
the staging area always fits in a single page. The semantics
of the execute phase are unchanged.
4.3 Compiler-enforced Transformations
We build our design into the compiler tool chain which
works on a subset of C / C++ programs. Figure 7 de-
scribes the mini-language supported by our compiler which
can transform existing applications. Given a program, the
programmer manually annotates the source code to demar-
cate the secret input to the program and specifies the size of
input with respect to which the transformation should guar-
antee PF-obliviousness. Specifically, he manually adds com-
piler directive begin_pf_sensitive and end_pf_sensitive
to mark the start and end of sensitive code and data. For
example, the developer can mark the encryption routine,
decryption routine, key derivation, key, nounce, and so on
as secret. Our tool comprises of analysis and transforma-
tion steps to enforce deterministic multiplexing which are
discussed next.
Identifying Sensitive Code and Data. In the first step,
our compiler front-end parses the source code and identi-
fies the programmer added directives. It then performs a
static analysis which transitively marks all the instructions
and variables within the lexical scope of programmer-marked
sensitive code as high. Non-sensitive instructions and vari-
ables are marked as low. At the end of the phase, each
instruction and variable in the code has a sensitivity tag
(high or low).
Determinising the Page-layout. Next, our tool performs
an analysis to decide the new virtual address layout for the
sensitive data and code (marked as high) for placing them in
the staging area. The initial step is to identify the existing
execution tree of the sensitive code. To achieve this, we
create a super-CFG wherein each function call is substituted
with the body of the function and all the bounded loops are
unrolled. This creates an execution tree such that all the
sensitive execution blocks are identified. We seek a mapping
Γ : B 7→ L such that all the execution blocks at the same
level in the execution tree are relocated to the same virtual
page address. There are multiple possible Γ mappings which
yield acceptable layouts, but our goal is to select the one
where the code and data staging areas always fit in a single
page. We first try to use the basic multiplexing for arranging
the blocks if the total size of all the blocks at a level is less
than 4096 bytes. If the size of the required staging area
exceeds one page, then we resort to compacted multiplexing
(See Section 4.2).
Instruction Rewriting. The last step of transformation
comprises of: (a) Adding logic for multiplexing (b) Adding
prologue-epilogue before and after the multiplexing to move
the code / data to and from staging area. Next, we rewrite
the instructions to introduce replicated accesses to data pages,
and instrument each execution block with a call to the code
multiplexing logic as described in Section 4.2. Finally, we
add prologue and epilogue before and after each execution
block at each CFG level.
Example. In case of EdDSA, we manually add compiler
pragmas to mark the user key variable and the signing rou-
tine as sensitive. Our analysis phase identifies 31 functions,
701 execution blocks, 178 variables as sensitive. It also col-
lects information about the call graph, function CFG and
access type (read or write) of the variables. After the anal-
ysis, our tool calculates (a) the staging area to be created in
first function ec_mul just before the first access to the key
(b) layout of the data staging area such that all the variables
fit in one page (c) the alignment of the execution block in the
staging area, (d) the new addresses of the sensitive variables
used in these execution block, and (e) instructions which are
to be updated for accessing the staging area. Finally, we add
code for preparing the staging area and instrument the code
instructions to use the data staging area values.
Security Invariant. The above compiler transformation
ensures that for the output program, all the execution blocks
at the same level in the execution tree are mapped to same
ordered list of virtual address locations. Thus for all the
inputs, the program exhibits the same page access profile
hence satisfying our PF-obliviousness property.
5. DEVELOPER-ASSISTED OPTIMIZATIONS
Apart from the automated-transformation, there can be
other strategies which have been manually confirmed to make
programs PF-oblivious. We discuss such performance opti-
mizations which allow developer assistance. In the future,
our compiler can be extended to search and apply these op-
timization strategies automatically.
5.1 Exploiting Data Locality
The main reason that input-dependent data accesses leak
information in pigeonhole attacks is that the data being ac-
cessed is split across multiple pages. In all such cases, the
deterministic multiplexing repetitively copies data to and
fro between the staging area and the actual data locations.
There are two key observations specific to these cases.
O1: Eliminating copy operations for read-only data.
We observe that most of the table lookup operations are on
pre-computed data and the code does not modify the table
entries during the entire execution. Since these sensitive
data blocks are used only in read operations, we can fetch
them into SAdata and discard them after the code block
executes. This saves a copy-back operation per code block.
Moreover, if the next code block in the execution tree uses
the same data blocks which already exist in SAdata, then
we need not copy them to SAdata. This save all the copy
operations after the data is fetched into the SAdata for the
first time. In case of AES, we require only two operation to
copy Table1 from P1 and P2 to SAdata. We can apply the
same strategy to Table3, so that the entire execution needs
only four copy operations.
O2: Page Realignment. All the data blocks which are
spread across page boundaries (specifically, S-Boxes) can be
grouped together and realigned at the start of the page.
This ensures that the set of sensitive data pages is minimum
for the entire execution. In the context of AES example,
both Table1 and Table3 cross the page boundary and use 3
pages. They can be aligned to page boundary and fit in 2
pages. Thus for deterministic multiplexing, the patch will
incur only two copy operations in total.
Note that the above strategies are safe and respect the
security invariant (Section 4.3) because all the eliminations
are independent of the input and thus the reduction in the
copy operations affects all the inputs uniformly.
5.2 Exploiting Code Locality
In case of input-dependent control transfers, automati-
cally determinising the control flow results in a high number
of multiplexing operations. To address this short-coming we
propose a set of strategies specific to the type of pigeon-
hole attacks, which reduces the overheads to an acceptable
range. We take the example of powm and demonstrate our
strategies.
Algorithm 1 shows the code structure and data access pat-
tern for the powm example. In the Libgcrypt implementation,
the actual function body (powm), the multiplication func-
tion (mul_mod) and the table lookup function (set_cond)
are located in three separate pages say P1, P2, P3 respec-
tively. Hence, the leakage from powm is due to the different
fault patterns generated from calls to mul_mod and set_cond
functions. Figure 8 (a) shows the page fault pattern for powm
with respect to these functions and Figure 8 (b) shows the
function arrangement for powm. Let us consider the imple-
mentations of deterministic multiplexing in Section 4.3 that
make calls to both these functions indistinguishable. For
this, we generate the call graphs of both functions which
identifies the set of sensitive functions are to be masked.
For each call to any of these sensitive function, we perform
a multiplexing operation. It iterates over the set of these
sensitive functions in a deterministic manner and copies all
the blocks to SAcode. The multiplexer then selects the cor-
A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1 A1
A0 A0 A0 A2 A0 A0 A2 A3
                     Inner Loop                                Inner Loop        
Outer Loop
 0           0           0          1           0          0         1
powm
mul_mod
karatsuba_release set_cond
karatsuba_case
mpih_divremmpih_mul
mul_N           mul_N_basecase
Arithmetic Operations (addition, subtraction, shift)
powm
mul_mod
karatsuba_release set_cond
karatsuba_case
mpih_divremmpih_mul
mul_N           mul_N_basecase
Arithmetic Operations (addition, subtraction, shift)
Figure 8: (a) Simplified page access profile for powm (Window size = 1) where A0, A1, A2, A3 sub-patterns
denote transitions between functions mul mod(), powm(), set cond() and karatsuba release() respectively.
(b) Call graph before enforcing deterministic multiplexing. (c) Alignment after enforcing deterministic mul-
tiplexing with optimization (O4), dotted and shaded functions are moved to separate code staging pages.
Algorithm 1 Libgcrypt modular exponentiation (powm).
INPUT: Three integers g, d and p where d1...dn is the binary repre-
sentation of d. OUTPUT: a ≡ gd (mod p).
procedure powm(g, d, p) . P1
w ← GET WINDOW SIZE(d), g0 ← 1, g1 ← g, g2 ← g2
for i← 1 to 2w−1 − 1 do . Precomputation
g2i+1 ← g2i−1 · g2 mul_mod p
end for
a← 1, j ← 0
while d 6= 0 do . Outer loop
j ← j+ COUNT LEADING ZEROS(d)
d← SHIFT LEFT(d, j)
for i← 1 to j + w do . Inner Loop
a← a · a mul_mod p . P2
end for
t← d1...dw;
j ← COUNT TRAILING ZEROS(t)
u← SHIFT RIGHT(t, j)
gu ← FETCH POWER(set_cond(u)) . P3
a← a · gu mul_mod p . P2
d← SHIFT LEFT(d, w)
end while
end procedure
rect block and executes it. In case of powm, we move powm,
mul_mod and set_cond to the staging area. This implemen-
tation of Section 4.3 incurs an overhead of 4000×, which is
prohibitive. We discuss our strategies in the context of this
example to describe the reasoning for the optimization.
O3A: Level Merging. The dominating factor in the deter-
ministic multiplexing is the number of copy and multiplexing
operations at each level in the execution tree. We observe
that by the virtue of code locality, code blocks across multi-
ple levels can be merged together in a single level. Specifi-
cally, we place the code blocks such that the caller and callee
function are contained within a page. For example, consider
3 code blocks a, b, c located in three separate pages. The
call graph is such that c is called by both a and b. If total
size of a, b, c put together is less than a page (4096 bytes),
then we can re-arrange the code such that all three of them
fit in a single page. In terms of the execution tree, it means
that we fold the sub-tree to a single code block.
O3B: Level Merging via Cloning. The above strategy
will not work in cases where the code blocks in a sub-tree
cannot fit in a single page. To address this, we use code repli-
cation i.e., we make copies of shared code block in multiple
pages. In our example, if blocks a, b, c cannot fit into a sin-
gle page, we rearrange and replicate the block c in both P2
and P3. After replication, a control-flow to c from neither a
nor b will incur a page fault. For powm, we split the mul_mod
into 2 pages and replicate the code for set_cond. Thus, call
to from powm to set_cond can be resolved to either of the
pages. It is easy to see that since security guarantee of the
1 if (c) {
2 result = result*2;
3 }
(a)
=⇒
1 staging_area[0] = result;
2 staging_area[1] = result*2;
3 result = staging_area[c];
(b)
Figure 9: Example for O5: Control-to-Data Depen-
dency Transformation.
compiler-transformed code holds true for the un-optimized
program execution tree, it trivially holds true for the reduced
trees in the above two cases because O3A-B are replicating
or merging the page access uniformly for all the inputs.
O4: MUX Elimination. Our next optimization is based
on the insight to eliminate the cost of the multiplexing oper-
ation itself by rearranging the code blocks. To achieve this,
we place the code blocks in the virtual pages to form an ex-
ecution tree so that all the transitions from one level to the
other exhibit the same page fault. This eliminates the mul-
tiplexing step altogether. In the above example of blocks a,
b and c, we place a and b into one page and c into another.
Thus, the control-flow from both a and b to c will page fault
in both the cases or none at all. We can chain together such
transitions for multiple levels in the tree, such that all the
blocks in next level are always placed in a different pages.
Figure 8 (c) shows the arrangement of functions in the code
staging area such that the functions are grouped together in
the same page. We apply this to the execution sub-tree of
mul_mod function in powm.
5.3 Peephole Optimizations
We apply a local peephole optimization to convert the
control-dependent code to data-dependency which eliminates
the need for code multiplexing.
O5: Control-to-Data Dependency Transformation.
Masking data page accesses is easier and hence we can con-
vert the input dependent code accesses to data accesses. For
example, the if-condition on value of c in Figure 9 (a) can
be rewritten as Figure 9 (b). Specifically, we perform an
if-conversion such that the code is always executed and the
condition is used to decide whether to retain the results or
discard them [19]. In the case of EdDSA, we first fetch the
value of res into SAdata (Refer to Figure 3 for code de-
tails). We execute add_points unconditionally and we use
test_bit as a selector to decide if the value in SAdata is to
be used. In the case where test_bit returns true, the actual
res in SAdata is used in the operation and is updated, else
it is discarded. The page fault pattern will be deterministic
since add_points will be executed on all iterations of the
loop and the operand of the function is always from SAdata.
This optimization is applied before the compiler transfor-
Table 1: Summary of cryptographic implementations susceptible to pigeonhole attacks, and their correspond-
ing information leakage in gcc v4.8.2 and clang/llvm v3.4. ∗ denotes that the leakage depends on the input.
[a : b] denotes the split of S-Box where a and b is percentage of table content across two different pages.
Library Algo
Secret
Entity
Vulnerable
Routine
Vulnerable
Portion (gcc)
Vulnerable
Portion (llvm)
Input Bits
Leakage
(gcc)
%
Leakage
(llvm)
%
Libgcrypt
(v1.6.3)
AES
Symmetric key
Encryption 2 T-Boxes [11:89] 2 T-Boxes [50:50]
128, 192,
256
25 14.01 8 4.51
CAST5
Key Generation
1 S-Box [38:62] 1 S-Box [48:52] 128 3 2.34 2 1.56
SEED 1 SS-Box [88:12] 1 SS-Box [27:73] 128 *6 4.69 *4 3.13
Stribog Password
used in
PBKDF2
Key Derivation
4 S-Boxes [51:49] 4 S-Boxes [51:49] 512 32 6.25 32 6.25
Tiger 2 S-Boxes [53:47] 2 S-Boxes [58:42] 512 4 0.78 4 0.78
Whrilpool 4 S-Boxes [45:55] 4 S-Boxes [52:48] 512 32 6.25 32 6.25
EdDSA
Session key
(hence
Private key)
Signing ec mul ec mul 512 512 100 512 100
DSA
Private key
Key generation
powm powm
256 *160 62.50 *160 62.50
Elgamal
Modular
exponentiation
400 *238 59.50 *238 59.50
RSA
Private key
mod (p-1)
2048 *1245 60.79 *1245 60.79
Private key
mod (q-1)
2048 *1247 60.89 *1247 60.89
OpenSSL
(v1.0.2)
CAST5
Symmetric key Key generation
1 S-Box [55:45] 1 S-Box [84:16] 128 2 1.56 *6 4.69
SEED 1 SS-Box [47:53] 1 SS-Box [67:33] 128 16 12.50 *6 4.69
Average 28.02 25.64
mation, hence its security follows from the basic security
invariant outlined in Section 4.3.
All our strategies O1-O5 are supported by our compiler
augmentation with programmer directives. Note that, our
optimization strategies are sound — the compiler still asserts
that the transformation preserves the PF-obliviousness of
the program. We discuss the empirical effectiveness of these
strategies in Section 6.4.
6. EVALUATION
Evaluation Goals. We aim to evaluate the effectiveness of
our proposed solutions for following main goals:
• Does our defense apply to all of our case studies?
• What are the performance trade-offs of our defense?
• How much performance improvements do developer-
assisted transformation offer?
Platform. SGX hardware is not yet fully rolled out and is
not publicly available for experimentation. As a recourse,
we conduct all our experiments on PodArch [45]; a system
similar to previous hypervisor solutions [17] and conceptu-
ally similar to SGX. Our machine is a Dell Latitude 6430u
host, configured with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-3687U 2.10GHz
CPU, 8GB RAM. We configure PodArch with one CPU,
2GB RAM and 64-bit Linux 3.2.53 Kernel on Debian Jessie
for all the experiments. We use LLVM v3.4 with the default
optimization flags for compiling our vanilla and patched case
studies. All the results are averaged over five runs.
6.1 Case Studies
Selection Criteria. Our defense techniques can be applied
to an application if it satisfies the conditions of balanced-
execution tree. We checked the programs FreeType, Hun-
spell, and libjpeg discussed in [52], they exhibit unbalanced
execution tree. Transforming these programs to exhibit bal-
anced execution tree causes an unacceptable loss in the per-
formance, even without our defense [49]. Hence, we limit
our evaluation to cryptographic implementations.
We present our results from the study of a general pur-
pose cryptographic library Libgcrypt v1.6.3 which is used in
GnuPG and a SSL implementation library OpenSSL v1.0.2 [2,
3,5]. We analyzed the programs compiled with the two most-
used compiler toolchains: gcc v4.8.2 and LLVM v3.4. For
both the compilers, we statically compiled all our programs
with the default optimization and security flags specified in
their Makefile. Of the 24 routines we analyze in total from
both the libraries, 10 routines are vulnerable to pigeonhole
attacks on both the compilers. Since our emphasis is not on
the attacks, we highlight the important findings below. Ta-
ble 1 summarizes the results of our study. Interested readers
can refer to Appendix C for the experimental details of each
case study attack.
• No Leakage. In Libgcrypt implementations of Blow-
fish, Camellia, DES, 3DES, IDEA, RC5, Serpent, Twofish,
ECDSA, and SHA512, all the input-dependent code
and data memory accesses are confined within a page
for the sensitive portions. Similarly AES, Blowfish,
Camellia, DES, 3DES, IDEA, RC5, Serpent, Twofish,
DSA, RSA, and SHA512 in OpenSSL do not exhibit
leakage via page fault side channel.
• Leakage via input dependent code page access.
In Libgcrypt, EdDSA and powm exhibit input depen-
dent code access across pages and are vulnerable to
pigeonhole attacks. The powm function is used in El-
Gamal, DSA and RSA which leaks bits of information
about the secret exponents.
• Leakage via input dependent data page access.
In case of AES, CAST5, SEED, Stribog, Tiger and
Whirlpool implementations in Libgcrypt, at least one
of the S-Boxes crosses page boundary and leaks in-
formation about the secret inputs. Similarly, imple-
mentations of CAST5 and SEED in OpenSSL are also
vulnerable.
6.2 Application to Case Studies
We transform the 8 Libgcrypt and 2 OpenSSL vulnerable
implementations of our case studies in our evaluation.
Compiler Toolchain Implementation. We implement
our automation tool in LLVM 3.4 and Clang 3.4 C / C++
front-end to transform C / C++ applications [1, 6]. For
our case studies, we log all the analysis information which
is used for the layout analysis and also to facilitate our
Table 2: Performance Summary. Columns 3, 5, 12 denotes the number of page faults incurred at runtime.
Columns 10 and 14 represent the total percentage overhead. > symbol denotes the program did not complete
within 10 hours after which we terminated it. A negative overhead means patched code executes faster than
the baseline. Tc and Te denote the time spent in preparing the staging area and actual execution respectively.
Library Cases
Vanilla Deterministic Multiplexing
Optimized
Deterministic Multiplexing
PF T (ms) PF Tc (ms) Te (ms) T (ms) Tc / T (%) Ovh (%) Opt PF T (ms) Ovh (%)
Libgcrypt
(v1.6.3)
AES 4 - 5 4.711 4 7.357 4.013 11.370 64.70 141.35 O1,O2 4 4.566 -3.08
CAST5 2 3.435 2 8.050 2.578 10.629 75.74 209.47 O1,O2 1 3.086 -10.15
EdDSA 0 10498.674 0
— >10 hrs —
>300000 O5 0 13566.122 29.22
powm 0 5318.501 0 >400000
O3 0 399614.244 7413.66
O4 0 5513.712 3.67
SEED 2 1.377 2 4.559 1.057 5.615 81.18 307.79 O1, O2 1 1.311 -4.80
Stribog 5 27.397 5 329.743 10.836 340.579 96.82 1143.13 O1, O2 4 28.563 4.26
Tiger 3 2.020 3 64.482 0.546 65.029 99.16 3119.69 O1, O2 2 1.840 -8.89
Whirlpool 5 27.052 5 141.829 10.174 151.490 93.28 459.99 O1, O2 4 23.744 -12.23
OpenSSL
(v1.0.2)
CAST5 2 1.147 2 0.815 0.690 1.505 54.139 31.19 O1, O2 1 0.880 -23.28
SEED 2 0.651 2 0.511 0.576 1.087 47.024 67.10 O1, O2 1 0.639 -1.74
Average Performance Overhead 70547.971 -2.70
Table 3: Analysis Summary. Column 3, 4, 5, 6,
7 denote the total number of functions, execution
blocks, loops, variables and lines of code in the sen-
sitive area respectively. Column 8 gives the number
pages allocated for staging area instances. Column
9, 10 gives the total number of function calls and
accesses to the staging area at runtime respectively.
Lib Cases
#
F
#
EB
#
L
#
V
LoC
#
P
#
RTF
#
MUX
Libg
crypt
AES 1 1 0 22 272 3 1 112
CAST5 1 1 0 11 47 3 2 320
EdDSA 31 701 56 178 1212 2 1 60725
powm 20 297 47 126 796 2 1 57660
SEED 1 11 1 17 56 3 1 128
Stribog 1 1 0 5 31 5 250 2000
Tiger 1 1 0 12 18 3 312 2496
Whirlpool 1 3 1 16 112 6 6 7680
Open
SSL
CAST5 1 12 4 14 93 3 1 160
SEED 1 1 0 13 58 3 1 128
developer-assisted improvements study. Our transformation
pass applies deterministic multiplexing to the programs at
the LLVM IR level. Table 3 shows the number of functions,
execution blocks, loops, variables and total size of code and
data staging area.
Empirical Validation. Our applications are compiled into
static binaries for testing. We run these executables on Po-
dArch [45] which is implemented on QEMU emulator, and
only supports static linking. To test our patched applica-
tions, we execute the standard regression test-suite available
with the cryptographic libraries (make check). To empiri-
cally validate that our defenses work, we ensure that the
page fault profile of patched executions under all test inputs
is indistinguishable w.r.t. page access profiles. To verify
the correctness, we analyze the page fault access patterns
in the transformed application using a PinTool [4] that logs
all instructions and memory accesses. We have analyzed
the PinTools logs and report that our deterministic multi-
plexing produces indistinguishable page access profiles for
all regression and test inputs.
6.3 Performance Evaluation
Normalized Baseline. To ensure that the choice of our
evaluation platform (PodArch) does not significantly bias
the overheads, we conduct two sets of measurements. First,
we run the unmodified OpenSSL and Libgcrypt implemen-
tations on PodArch and measure the execution time. This
forms the baseline for all our performance measurements.
Column 3, 4 in Table 2 shows the number of page faults
and the execution time for vanilla code in PodArch. Sec-
ond, to check that the overheads of our defenses are not an
artifact of PodArch, we also run our vanilla and modified
binaries on native Intel CPU Intel Core i7-2600 CPU. The
overheads on a native CPU are similar to that on PodArch
and deviate only within a range of 1%. This confirms that
our baseline of PodArch is unbiased and does not skew our
experimental results.
Overhead. We calculate the overhead by comparing the
baseline performance of unmodified code against the execu-
tion time of the patched application functions. We use input
patterns to represent the best, worst and average case ex-
ecutions of the application, specifically, inputs with (a) all
0s, (b) all 1s, (c) random number of 0s and 1s, and (d) all
the regression tests from the built-in test- suite.
The applications patched with the deterministic multi-
plexing technique incurs an average overhead of 705× and
up to maximum overhead of 4000× in case of powm (Column
10 in Table 2). To investigate the main sources of these over-
heads we measure the break-down for the fetch step and the
execute step in deterministic multiplexing. We observe that
the overhead is mainly dominated by the copying of data to
and from the staging area in the fetch step (Column 6 and 9
in Table 2), and accounts for 76.5% out of the total overhead
on average. We notice that the fetch step time is especially
high for cases like Stribog and Tiger where it accounts for
96.82% and 99.16% of the overhead.
6.4 Effectiveness of Optimizations
We apply the developer-assisted strategies discussed in
Section 5 to experimentally validate and demonstrate their
effectiveness. They reduce the average overhead from 705×
to −2.7% for our 10 case studies; 29.22% in the worst case.
In the case of powm, O3 reduces the performance overhead
from 4000× to 74×. With O4 we completely remove mem-
ory copying for code determinization which reduces the over-
head from 74× to 3.67%. We apply O1 to the 8 cases of
input dependent data page access to reduce the number of
copy operations. Further we also apply O2 to reorder the
lookup table layout, such that after the developer-assisted
transformations are in place, the execution incurs lower page
faults. In fact, our patched version executes faster than the
baseline code (as denoted by negative overhead in Column
14 in Table 2) for 7 cases. After manual inspection, this
is explained because in the patched code, the lookup tables
take up less number of pages which reduces the total num-
ber of page faults incurred during the execution (Column
12 in Table 2). On the other hand, in the vanilla case, the
program incurs more page faults which is a costly operation.
Thus, eliminating this cost results in a negative overhead.
For EdDSA, we directly apply the peephole optimization O5
which transforms the input dependent code access to data
access. This reduces the overhead from 3000× to 29.22%.
7. HARDWARE-ENABLED DEFENSES
So far we have discussed purely software solutions. Read-
ers might wonder if pigeonhole attacks can be mitigated with
hardware support. Here, we briefly discuss an alternative
hardware-assisted defense which guarantees enclaved execu-
tion at a worst-case cost of 6.77% on our benchmarks.
7.1 Our Proposal: Contractual Execution
We propose a hardware-software technique wherein the
enclave is guaranteed by the hardware that certain virtual
addresses will always be mapped to physical memory dur-
ing its execution. The enclave application is coded opti-
mistically assuming that the OS will always allocate specific
number of physical pages to it while executing its sensitive
code blocks. The enclave informs its memory requirements
to the OS via a callback mechanism. These requirements act
as a contract if the OS agrees, or else the OS can refuse to
start execution of the enclave. The enclave states the set of
virtual addresses explicitly to the OS before starting its sen-
sitive computation. The CPU acts as a contract mediator
and is responsible for enforcing this guarantee on the OS.
We term such an execution as contractual execution. Note
that the contract is not a hard guarantee i.e., the enclave
cannot pin the pages in physical memory to launch a denial-
of-service attack on the OS. In fact, the OS has the flexibility
to take back pages as per its own scheduling policy. How-
ever, when the CPU observes that OS has deviated from the
contract — either genuinely or by injecting random faults,
it immediately reports the contract violation to the enclave.
This needs two types of changes in the hardware (a) support
for notifying the enclave about its own page faults and (b)
guaranteeing a safe mechanism for enclave to mitigate the
contract violation.
Contract Enforcement in SGX. In a traditional CPU
as well as in original SGX specification [7], all page faults
are reported directly to the OS without the intervention
of the faulting process. Thus, the process is unaware of
its own page faults. This makes it impossible for the en-
clave to detect pigeonhole attacks. For contractual execu-
tion, the hardware needs to report its faults to the process
instead, which calls for a change in the page fault seman-
tics. A limited amount of support is already available for
this in SGX. As per the new amendments in Revision 2,
SGX can now notify an enclave about its page faults by
setting the SECS.MISCSELECT.EXINFO bit [8, 10]. When an
enclave faults, the SGX hardware notifies the enclave about
the fault, along with the virtual address, type of fault, the
permissions of the page, register context. We can think of
implementing contractual execution on SGX directly by set-
ting the SGX configuration bit such that when there is a
page fault, the enclave will be notified directly by the CPU.
The benign OS is expected to respect the contract and never
swap out the pages during the execution. However a mali-
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Figure 10: Contractual Execution. (1) Enclave reg-
isters a contract (2) CPU directly reports the fault
to the enclave page fault handler. (3) Enclave page
fault handler fakes access for time t - k and sends
command to terminate. (4) Enclave fault handler
terminates the enclave.
cious OS may swap out pages, in which case the CPU is
responsible for reporting page faults for these pages to the
enclave directly.
Mitigating Contract Violation. When the CPU signals
contract violation and the control returns to the enclave, it
is important to terminate the program safely, without leak-
ing any information (See Figure 10). When the enclave is
notified about contract violation, it is the enclaves respon-
sibility to decide whether to handle the fault or ignore it.
One straightforward way to handle the fault is terminate
the enclave, but our observation is that immediate program
termination leaks information (See Appendix A). In our so-
lution, our goal is to hide the following facts (a) whether
the enclave incurred a page fault during the execution after
the contract is enforced (b) if so, at which point in the exe-
cution tree did the fault occur. To this end, in our defense
we intercept the page faults from the underlying hardware
and from that point of contract violation, we perform a fake
execution to suppress the location at which the fault hap-
pened. This defense can only work if we can ensure that
the enclave page fault handler is necessarily invoked. In the
present SGX design it is unclear if the hardware can guaran-
tee the invocation of the page fault handler. So we propose
that SGX can adopt this solution in the future. The details
of this mechanism are a bit involved and we for brevity we
discuss it in Appendix B for interested readers. We have
implemented this defense in PodArch and our evaluation
on Libgcrypt 7 shows that such an approach incurs an over-
head of 6.77% which is much lower as compared to the purely
software based solutions (Table 4). We elide the details here
due to space limits. Please refer to Appendix A for details.
7.2 Discussion: Other Alternative Approaches
Randomization of Page Access. Oblivious RAM (ORAM)
is a generic defense that randomizes the data access pat-
terns [24, 47]. Intuition suggests that the enclave can use
ORAM techniques to conceal its memory access pattern. In
this case, when an adversary observes the physical storage
locations accessed, the ORAM algorithm will ensure that
the adversary has negligible probability of learning anything
about the true (logical) access pattern. For our AES ex-
ample, we can place the tables in an ORAM to randomize
their ordering, such that the adversary cannot distinguish
7We did not implement contractual execution for OpenSSL
because it requires dynamic loading which is not supported
in PodArch.
Table 4: Evaluation. Column 2 denotes the bucket size (Code + Data). Columns 5 and 7 denote average
execution time and deviation in benign OS. Columns 8-10 denote total time spent for 3 test-case scenarios
that stress the corner cases in Libgcrypt. Both the executions exhibit no statistically significant differences.
Cases
Bucket
Size
PF
Handler
(Bytes)
Benign OS Malicious OS
Vanilla
Time (ms)
Contractual
Time (ms)
Ovh (%) Dev (%) T1 (ms) T2 (ms) T3 (ms)
AES 3 + 3 274 4.157 4.161 0.107 4.689 4.287 4.179 4.059
CAST5 1 + 2 231 2.901 2.969 2.34 9.938 3.054 3.003 2.845
EdDSA 19 + 1 204 9729.526 9754.806 0.260 35.952 9960.311 9815.837 10146.534
powm 21 + 1 256 4783.997 4813.028 0.607 12.225 5155.958 5103.789 5224.345
SEED 2 + 2 261 1.269 1.381 8.917 4.821 1.337 1.392 1.333
Stribog 1 + 5 253 0.803 0.874 8.957 1.940 0.863 0.879 0.887
Tiger 1 + 3 244 0.506 0.644 27.255 4.876 0.667 0.659 0.675
Whirlpool 1 + 5 245 12.680 13.409 5.746 1.338 13.559 13.451 13.308
Average 6.77
which offsets in the tables are accessed. However, ORAM
involves continuous shuffling and re-encryption of the data
after every access. In our case studies, the lookup opera-
tions dominate the computation in cryptographic implemen-
tations. For millions of accesses, the cost incurred for the
shuffling is significant poly log (say over 1000×) and slows
down the applications, which is not desirable [44]. Further,
the best known ORAM technique requires a constant private
storage for shuffling the data blocks [35]. In case of pigeon-
hole attack in SGX, the private storage is not permanently
available to the enclave and the OS can probe operations on
private memory via page faults. Thus, additional hardware
support is necessary for ORAM based randomization to jus-
tify the assumption of a secure constant private storage.
Self-Paging. Instead of relying on the OS for page man-
agement, the enclaved execution can take the responsibility
of managing its memory. Applications can implement self-
paging to deal with their own memory faults using their own
physical memory to store page tables [25]. In self-paging
CPU design, all the paging operations are removed from the
kernel; instead the kernel is simply responsible for dispatch-
ing fault notifications. Given a fixed amount of physical
memory, the enclave can decide which virtual addresses are
mapped to this memory, and which are swapped out. The
problem with self-paging is — how can the enclave ensure
that the OS has allocated physical pages to it? To guaran-
tee this, the enclave should be able to pin certain physical
memory pages, such that the OS cannot swap them out.
This directly opens the possibility for a denial-of-service at-
tack from the enclave, because it can refuse to give up the
pinned pages. A hardware reset would be the only alterna-
tive to reclaim all the enclave pages, which is an undesirable
consequence for the OS. Another possibility is that the en-
clave performs self-paging without assuming fixed private
physical memory. But this is unsafe, since the OS still con-
trols how much memory to allocate to the enclave, retaining
the ability to pigeonhole the memory pages. In both the
above alternatives, there is a dilemma — should the enclave
trust the OS and likewise. Hence, it is unclear how self-
paging, with or without fixed physical memory, can defend
against pigeonhole attacks.
8. RELATED WORK
Attacks on Enclaved Execution. Xu et al. have re-
cently shown that the OS can use the page fault channel
on applications running on SGX based systems to extract
extract sensitive information [52]. The attacks are limited
to general user programs such as image and text processing.
On the contrary we study a cryptographic implementations
which is specific class of applications more relevant in the
context of enclaves. More importantly, we show that the
purported techniques discussed are not effective against pi-
geonhole attacks. As as a new contribution, we propose and
measure the effectiveness of concrete solutions to prevent
against such attacks on cryptographic implementations.
Side-channel Attacks. Yarom et al. study cache chan-
nel attacks wherein the adversary has the power to flush
and reload the cache, which can be used to attacks elliptic
curve cryptographic routines such as ECDSA [53, 54]. Re-
cent study on caches has shown that even the last-level cache
is vulnerable to side-channel attacks [37]. Timing and cache
attacks have been used to by-pass kernel space ASLR [28],
VMs [29], android applications [30], cloud servers [57] and
users [42] both locally and remotely [14]. Even web browsers
can be exploited remotely via cache attacks on JavaScript [41].
Side-channel Detection & Defenses. Various detection
mechanisms have been explored for side channels ranging
from instruction level analysis to compiler techniques [15,21,
55]. Tools such as CacheQuant can automatically quantify
the bits of information leaked via cache side-channels [33].
Techniques such as input blinding, time bucketing are also
available but are limited to specific algorithms [32,34]. Side
channel attacks in hypervisors, cloud VMs, kernel are mit-
igated using determinising strategies, control-flow indepen-
dence and safe scheduling [9,31,40,50,58]. Our deterministic
multiplexing defense is similar to memory-trace oblivious-
ness techniques proposed for secure computation [36,51].
Randomization & Self-paging Defenses. ORAM tech-
niques are widely used in secure computation and multi-
party computations. Recent work demonstrate safe lan-
guage, compiler techniques, and hypervisor based approaches
which use ORAM. As discussed in Section 7.2, ORAM tech-
niques may be insufficient without extra hardware support.
On the other hand, self-paging assumes that the enclave will
always have control over a fixed size [25]. In case that either
party breaks this assumption, it opens a potential for DOS
from enclave and pigeonholing from the OS.
9. CONCLUSION
We systematically study pigeonhole attack, a new threat
prevalent in secure execution platforms including Intel SGX,
InkTag, OverShadow and PodArch. By analyzing crypto-
graphic implementation libraries, we demonstrate the sever-
ity of pigeonhole attacks. We propose a purely software
defense called deterministic multiplexing and build a com-
piler to make all our case studies safe against pigeonhole
attacks. It is practically deployable with modest overhead.
Finally, we present an alternative hardware-based solution
which incurs an average overhead of 6.77%.
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APPENDIX
A. SAFE CONTRACTUAL EXECUTION
What should the enclave do once it detects that it is under
attack or a violation of the contract?
Naive Self-termination Strategy. A naive strategy is to
immediately terminate the enclaved execution. Such deter-
ministic self-termination by the enclave leaks the point of
page fault to the OS, which leaks 1 bit of information per
execution. Note that the OS can repeatedly invoke the vul-
nerable application, stealing different pages in each run and
observing the different points of self- termination in each
execution. Such an adaptive pigeonholing adversary learns
significant information — in fact, with enough trials the OS
learns the same amount of information by observing self-
termination patterns as by observing page faulting patterns
in a vanilla enclaved execution!
For concrete illustration, consider the example of AES in
which there are 4 input-dependent S-Box (table) lookup in
each round. Let us consider the case of two secret inputs I1
and I2 such that execution under I1 never access a page P1 in
all of its S-box lookups, while the execution under I2 accesses
P1 during the first S-box lookup. To distinguish between I1
and I2 in a contractual execution, the OS can steal the data
page P1 before the 3rd S-box lookup and observes whether
the enclave self- terminates abruptly. If it does, the OS can
infer that the secret input is I2. Thus, abrupt termination
serves as an oracle for the OS to distinguish between two
inputs I1 and I2. Specifically, the OS observe two things
in case of such termination: (a) the enclave was trying to
access P1, (b) the index for 3rd lookup is less than 0x1c
since it accessed P1. Hence, deterministic self-termination
is not safe strategy.
To address the limitation, we introduce the notion of a
working set of pages. Each sensitive logic in the application
defines a minimum set of physical pages that an enclave
should have in the memory when executing it. We refer to
this working set as a bucket, whose size is specified in the
contract. We first analyze the program execution tree and
identify all the code and data pages that are accessed at all
the levels of the execution blocks. This defines the minimum
required bucket size for a program. At the start of execution
of a sensitive code area, the enclave initiates a contract and
requests the OS to commit to allocate number of physical
pages equal to the size of bucket (Step-1 in Figure 10 (a)).
Once the bucket is loaded in memory, the enclave executes
the program assuming that the contract is enforced.
In the event of a fault within a bucket, the CPU immedi-
ately vectors control to the enclave’s page fault handler. It is
the responsibility of the enclave page fault handler to safely
terminate the enclave. As mentioned earlier, the enclave
cannot self- terminate immediately when it detects that the
bucketed page is missing. This may reveal that the enclave
was accessing the page and hence a particular code branch
/ data in the path.
Once a contract violation is detected by the enclave, the
enclave enters into what we call as fake execution mode. The
fake execution mode is simply a spin-loop executed by the
enclave page fault handler, which pads the execution time
of the program until it reaches the end of the execution
tree. In essence, the fake execution executes dummy blocks
to mask the time of occurrence of the page-fault from the
OS. To execute this strategy, the enclave page fault handler
needs to know the time remaining (or elapsed) in the bucket
execution. This information is kept in a dedicated register
during the program execution, and is updated at the end of
each block. The enclave page fault handler calculates the
remaining time to execute till the end of the tree using the
information in the dedicated register. Figure 10 (a) shows
the point at which the contract violation occurs (Step 2),
the fake execution (Step 3), and the termination (Step 4).
For such a defense to be secure, the execution of the en-
clave must be indistinguishable to the adversary, indepen-
dent of its strategy to respect or violate the contract. Our
described strategy achieves this goal. Consider three sce-
narios: (a) the OS obeys the contract, (b) the OS deviates
from the contract resulting in one or more page faults, and
(c) the OS deviates from the contract but no page faults
result. Our defense ensures that all such three executions
are indistinguishable from the adversary’s perspective. The
enclaves performs a real execution in scenario (a) and (c)
and a fake execution only in (b). All real executions incurs
no page fault in contractual execution — hence they are in-
distinguishable trivially. It remains to show that the fake
execution is indistinguishable from a real execution. Specif-
ically, the time taken by the fake execution is the same as
that by a real execution (as explained above). Further, since
all page faults are redirected to the enclave, the OS does not
see faults for the bucket pages, and does not learn the se-
quence of the faulting addresses. This establishes that a fake
execution is indistinguishable from the set of real executions.
B. PREVENTING PIGEONHOLE ATTACK
ON ENCLAVE PAGE FAULT HANDLER
To ensure that the enclave page fault handler can execute
our strategy outlined above, the hardware must guarantee a
mechanism to vector control to a enclave page fault handler.
The current SGX specifications have a mechanism to notify
the enclave when there is a page fault, so that the enclave can
implement its own page fault handler. However, it does not
specify whether the hardware guarantees that the enclave’s
page fault handler code will be mapped in memory when
the enclave is executing. If this guarantee is missing, then a
fault on the enclave page fault handler will lead to a double-
fault — the accessed page as well as the fault handler page
are missing [45]. To mitigate this threat, the hardware must
eliminate double-faults by design. Informing the OS about
a double fault in unsafe, as it leaks the information that
enclave page fault handler was invoked thereby making fake
execution clearly distinguishable.
To prevent this leakage, we propose that the CPU allow
the enclave to specify one virtual page in its contract to al-
ways be mapped during its execution. Specifically, the CPU
checks if that this page is mapped whenever control enter the
enclave (say in the start of enclave execution or subsequently
after a context-switch). Note this our proposal for “pinning”
a page is different from self-paging — in our defense, the
OS is free to invalidate the contract by taking away the re-
served page. This will result in the enclave being aborted as
soon as the context switches to the enclave, whether or not
the enclave accesses the reserved page. This abort strategy
is thus independent of page accesses in the enclave, and at
the same time, the enclave poses no risk of denial-of-service
to the OS. We recommend this as an extension to enclave
systems such as SGX.
C. DETAILS OF OUR ATTACKS
EdDSA. In Section 2.3 we explained how the page fault
pattern for scalar multiplication in EdDSA leaks value of r
completely. To use EdDSA, the two parties first agree upon
the public curve (or domain) parameters to be used. For
message M , the signing algorithm outputs a tuple (R,S) as
the signature. Specifically, the sender derives a session key
r for M and uses with a private key a. Here, the value of r
is used in the scalar multiplication operation r × G, where
G is the public elliptic curve point. In the verification step,
the receiver checks if 〈M, (R,S)〉 is a valid signature. If the
adversary knows the value of r, he can recover the value of
a, and easily forge signatures for any message M .
powm. Modular exponentiation (also referred to as powm)
is a basic operation to calculate gd mod p. It is used in many
public-key cryptographic routines (for e.g., RSA, DSA, El-
Gamal). Specially during key generation, decryption and
signing it involves a secret exponent (private key). Algo-
rithm 1 shows the outline of powm implementation in Libgcrypt
v1.6.3. powm uses a sliding window technique for exponen-
tiation. This is essentially a m-ary exponentiation which
partitions the bits of the exponent into constant length win-
dows. The algorithm then performs as many multiplications
as there are non-zero words by sliding the window across
the trailing zeros. The actual powm function body, the mul-
tiplication function and the selection function are located
in three separate pages. By the virtue of this, the OS can
clearly identify each call to a multiplication and a selection
using the page access profile.
Let us see the case when the window size W = 1. As
the readers will observe, there are two multiplication oper-
ations, one in the inner loop and one in the outer loop, as
highlighted in Algorithm 1. In order to know the exact value
of the secret exponent, it is important to identify in which
loop a particular multiplication operation is invoked. If the
adversary can distinguish each time the multiplication is in-
voked in the inner loop, it effectively tells the number of 0
bits that the execution shifted after a bit 1. To differentiate
the inner loop multiplication (a ·a) from the outer loop mul-
tiplication (a ·gu), the adversary uses the following strategy.
It observes when gu is fetched from the precomputed table.
To do this, the algorithm invokes a bit checking logic and
matches the value of u with the corresponding value from the
list of precomputed values. Since the logic for set_cond is
located in a different page, by observing the page sequence,
the attacker can group each individual multiplication to the
loop it belongs to. This leaks all the bits (1 separated by
string of 0s) in the exponent in a single execution. Figure 8
(a) shows the exact page fault pattern for powm. The ad-
versary needs approximately WR trials to extract the whole
key, where R is the number of iterations in the outer loop.
AES. As discussed in Section 2.3, there are 4 T-Box tables
in total each with 256 values, of which 2 are split across
pages., For the first block of plain text, the routine directly
uses the first 128 bits of cipher key in first round 8. The
initial uncertainty of the OS is 2128. With pigeonhole at-
tack, the OS knows for 64 bits if the index is less than 0x1c
because they are for lookups in vulnerable S-Boxes. Thus,
the OS only needs to make 264 × 288 guesses. Thus, the
information leakage (in bits) = log2(Initial Uncertainty –
Remaining Uncertainty). log2(2
128 − (264 × 288)) = 25.54 ˜
25 bits [46]. Thus, AES leaks 25 bits in first rounds for all
key sizes 128, 192, 256.
Others. We use similar calculations steps for the remain-
ing cases — CAST5, SEED, Stribog, Tiger and Whirlpool.
SEED leaks 22 bits and CAST5 leaks 2 bits in both Libgcrypt
and OpenSSL. Libgcrypt, the cryptographic hash implemen-
tations Whirlpool, Stribog and Tiger leak 32, 32 and 4 bits of
the input key respectively in Password- Based Key Deriva-
tion Function PBKDF2 (Table 1).
8We trun off the Intel AES-NI hardware acceleration in this
case.
